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Approved For Release 2002/08/08 : CIA-RDP82-00457R006800150006-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone)

CD NO.

DATE DIST: 6 Feb 51

25X1C

SUBJECT Comments on the Prague Resolution by Fred Oelssner

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

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In a lecture held before the assembled student body of the Karl Marx Academy [REDACTED] Fred Oelssner, member of the SED Politbüro and the Party's foremost theoretician, made the following statements:

- a. The Prague Resolution criticizes neither Adenauer nor the Bonn Government. That is no coincidence, but was done on purpose. It is now our tactic to aim the main barrage against the principal enemy, America.*
- b. The Prague Resolution leaves open the possibility of direct negotiations between the DDR and Bonn. The salient point, as far as the policy of the Politbüro and the DDR government are concerned, is the proposal to form an all-Germany council composed of an equal number of East and West representatives. This fourth point makes no mention of the DDR or of Bonn.**
- c. Point four raises the question: Can German unity be accomplished without war? The Eastern answer has been given. The final answer rests now with the West German representatives. Their attitude already indicates the importance attached to this point. Walter Ulbricht has declared explicitly that one has to be prepared to make compromises and to yield. The chief task of this policy, now in its formative phase, and of the all-Germany council, we consider to be the taking of joint measures against remilitarization. The next step must not be a referendum. During this phase of development we attach no value to a referendum.
- d. Summing up: there exists a favorable situation in Western Germany. (Resignation of Minister Heinemann, Niemoeller's stand on remilitarization, statements of Naval Captain Moecke, organized refusals to bear arms.) Our most important task at this stage is to attain the Aktionseinheit (united action) of the working class in Western Germany, particularly between communists and social democrats. Unfortunately we are lagging behind in this respect. Many social democrat functionaries have succumbed to anti-Soviet propaganda as evident at the Forst Zinna conference. In this connection, sectarianism within the KPD should not be underestimated.

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Next Review Date: 2008

Document No. [REDACTED]
Change in Class [REDACTED]
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
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* [redacted] Comment. In the subsequent discussion, students pointed out that Oelssner instead of using the term "Hauptstoss" had spoken of the "Hauptfeuer". Oelssner in his concluding remarks stated that the two terms have the same meaning and that the "Hauptstoss" is directed against American Imperialism. In the light of a later address (26 November 1950) given by Anton Ackermann before the same assemblage, in which he declared that all inner-party discussion of the direction of the "Hauptstoss" should be avoided, source surmises that, as heretofore, the Bonn Government is considered the main target of SED attack in the West.

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** [redacted] Comment. It was obvious from the context and manner of delivery that Oelssner was implying that should the attempts to bring about direct negotiations between the DDR and Bonn fail, there always remains the possibility of inviting West German representatives who are not members of the Bonn Government.

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